

UNCLASSIFIED PORTION

**SECRET**

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TALKING POINTS ON PAKISTAN

- Pakistan is making a determined effort to acquire a nuclear explosives capability.
- It is pursuing both the enrichment and reprocessing paths to fissile material.
- The US has repeatedly attempted to dissuade Pakistan from persisting in this effort.
- In this connection, under the Symington Amendment we cut-off certain US assistance in early 1979.
- We have also worked closely with other nuclear suppliers to impede Pakistani acquisition of the technology and equipment necessary to support their nuclear ambitions.
- It appears that our efforts have delayed the Pakistanis but they are still pursuing their program aggressively and - barring a change in Pakistani attitudes - will probably eventually succeed in developing the capability to produce the material needed for a nuclear device.
- Such a step would have serious consequences. Not only would it be a blow to our worldwide non-proliferation effort but it would be destabilizing to security in South Asia including Pakistan's own security.
- We have made this point repeatedly to the Pakistanis.
- Moreover, a Pakistani nuclear test could well stimulate a nuclear arms race on the sub-continent.
- Thus, it continues to be extremely important to attempt to channel Pakistan's nuclear program into a peaceful direction.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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REVIEWED BY SEC 8 Date DEC 30 1988

FOI, EO or PA exemptions b1, b7C, b7D

TS authority to:

OADR

( ) CLASSIFY as  
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-- The punitive measures we have taken in the past to cut off certain US foreign assistance to Pakistan have not succeeded in dissuading the Pakistanis.

-- Although the consultations with other suppliers have met with some success and will be continued, they alone will not be sufficient.

-- Therefore, we have concluded that the best way to pursue our non-proliferation goals is to take steps such as we have suggested to meet Pakistan's fundamental security concerns.

Symington-Glenn Waiver

-- It is true that renewed assistance to Pakistan would require legislative changes in the Symington Amendment.

-- Our proposal in this regard is modest - the language of the Symington Amendment waiver provision should simply be modified to conform to the language of the waiver provision of the Glenn Amendment and of the several similar provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

-- Glenn permits waiver if the President determines and certifies that termination of assistance "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." This formulation allows the President appropriate flexibility to respond to US national security and non-proliferation interests.

-- Symington, however, only permits a waiver when the President determines and certifies that termination of assistance "would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests and "he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so." This is not consistent with the other waiver standards provisions in law on nuclear matters.

-- The current situation is anomalous - it is easier to grant a waiver to a country after a nuclear explosion, which is covered by Glenn, than it is to do so in event enrichment technology is acquired, which falls under Symington.

-- Similarly, the conditions under the NNPA for waivers for countries engaged in nuclear explosive development work the same as those found in Glenn.

-- The conditions for implementing the Symington waiver in fact defeats the purpose of providing for a Presidential waiver. That is, the President cannot override the sanctions provisions even where our non-proliferation or national security interests demand it.

-- We, therefore, believe that the waiver language in the Symington Amendment should be revised to conform to that in the Glenn Amendment.

#### Timing

-- In 1979, we publically estimated that Pakistan could conduct a test in two to three years.

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-- That schedule has since been delayed.

-- I would prefer not to be more precise in open session.

Technology Transfer

-- We believe that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive technology to third countries.

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b-1  
a-5

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Pages Nos. 5 & 6

have been withheld in their entirety.

Exemption(s) invoked: (b)(1) (a)(5)

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